Abstract. It is a well known fact that encryption schemes cannot hide a plaintext length when it is unbounded. We thus admit that an approximation of it may leak and we focus on hiding its precise value. Some standards such as TLS or SSH offer to do it by applying some pad-then-encrypt techniques. In this study, we investigate the information leakage when these techniques are used. We define the notion of padding scheme and its associated security. We show that when a padding length is uniformly distributed, the scheme is nearly optimal. We also show that the insecurity degrades linearly with the padding length.
Introduction
Although an encryption process makes a plaintext unreadable to adversaries, the resulting ciphertext may still leak some information. Practically, we can always distinguish an encrypted SMS message from an encrypted HD video stream. Namely, the length of a plaintext may give some information away and it can often be deduced from the ciphertext. For instance, the lengths of a plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext are identical or differ by a small number of bits when the encryption is done by a stream or a block cipher. One way of hiding the plaintext size is to use random padding before the encryption which appends a padding of random length in {1, 2, . . . , B}. In this work, we investigate the information leakage when a random padding is used.
Let us consider a symmetric encryption system in which encryption under a key K is denoted by Enc K and decryption is denoted by Dec K . In the Shannon model [10] , the plaintext and the key are defined by independent random variables X and K. Perfect secrecy is defined by the statistical independence of X and Y = Enc K (X). If this property is satisfied, we can easily see that the plaintext domain must be finite: if y is a possible value for Y , then p = Pr[Y = y] is positive. For any possible value x for X, we must have Pr[Enc K (x) = y] = p due to perfect secrecy. Since Enc K (x) = y implies Dec K (y) = x, p ≤ Pr[Dec K (y) = x].
The present version corrects a few typos from the published one.
By summing over all possible x's, we deduce that the number of such x is bounded by 1 p , which is a finite number. 1 This impossibility result extends to weaker security notions. In [3, 4] , Chor and Kushilevitz consider α-weak security, given α ≥ 1, which states that for all possible x 1 , x 2 , y, we have
Perfect secrecy corresponds to the α = 1 case. Encryption over a countably infinite domain cannot be α-weak secure for any α: if x 2 and y are possible simultaneous values for X and Y , p = A public-key cryptosystem is nothing but an encryption scheme in which Enc K can be described by using public values. So, the above impossibility results also apply to public-key cryptography.
A standard security notion for encryption is the IND-CPA security (indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks) in which an adversary can make some chosen plaintext encryptions and tries to get an advantage for distinguishing the encryption of either x 1 or x 2 , two plaintexts of same length selected by himself. For public-key encryption, the adversary makes the encryption himself by using the public key so IND-CPA and IND-OTE notions are equivalent. For symmetric encryption, he must be provided access to an encryption oracle. In the IND-OTE game, there is no such access so there may be a gap between IND-CPA and IND-OTE notions. Still, these notions impose that x 1 and x 2 have the same length so they offer no guarantee about keeping the plaintext length secret. We call extended IND-OTE game (E-IND-OTE) the notion where the restriction that x 1 and x 2 have the same length is relaxed. 1 Actually, this proof only holds for countable sets. More generally, we should define our properties with non-discrete probabilities to be able to consider uncountably infinite sets. In theory, we could achieve perfect secrecy over uncountably infinite sets. However, the encryption algorithm will no longer be polynomially bounded on classical computational models. So, we only consider countable sets in the present paper. We could probably reopen this case when considering encryption over a space of quantum states. (See [9] for more discussions.)
The Phan-Vaudenay result says that if all adversaries in the E-IND-OTE game have their advantage bounded by a given ε < 1, then the encryption domain must be finite. Ideally, we would like to design secure encryption schemes over an infinite set. Practically, we could live with encryption domains which are finite but large enough. Indeed, we can assume that the set of bitstrings of length bounded by a few petabytes is a virtually infinite set. So, we could design an encryption scheme over this domain with a pretty good security. However, for efficiency reasons, we would not like that the encryption of a very small plaintext (say a few kilobytes) would lead to a ciphertext of one petabyte. Therefore, we should consider encryption schemes which are somehow length-preserving but also length hiding. To make it possible, we relax the E-IND-OTE security notion and consider the ∆-IND-OTE game in which the submitted plaintexts have a length difference bounded by ∆. The IND-OTE (resp. E-IND-OTE) notions correspond to ∆ = 0 (resp. ∆ = +∞).
In the sequel we consider encryption schemes defined by
where Enc 0 is a length-preserving IND-OTE-secure scheme and pad is a probabilistic padding scheme. That is, pad generates a postfix-free random string which can be extracted after decryption. Typically, pad(x) is a random bitstring whose length N is a random variable. This kind of construction is proposed e.g. in TLS [6] or SSH [12] . For instance, here is a quote from [6] :
Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length. The padding MAY be any length up to 255 bytes, as long as it results in the TLSCiphertext.length being an integral multiple of the block length. Lengths longer than necessary might be desirable to frustrate attacks on a protocol that are based on analysis of the lengths of exchanged messages.
This suggests that we could arbitrarily pad up to B = 32 (resp. B = 16) blocks of data to hide the exact length of a plaintext, when the block cipher uses blocks of 64 bits (resp. 128 bits).
More generally, we consider preencryption schemes which are not necessarily of form x pad(x). We may consider several assumptions:
-(uniformity) the distribution of the length overhead between x and Enc(x) is fixed (it does not depend on x) -(almost length-preserving property) the length overhead is bounded by B Given B and ∆, our aim is to find the best distribution N to achieve optimal ∆-IND-OTE security.
Related work. Padding often serves another purpose. Namely, it is used to fill incomplete blocks to encrypt a plaintext using a block cipher. Our notion of preencryption scheme is similar to the notion of encoding by Paterson and Watson [8] who consider several practical schemes. They analyze the security of the pad-then-encrypt scheme in a practical case where the original encryption scheme is a block cipher in CTR mode. This follows some other work in which they identified a terrible interaction between the padding scheme and the decryption algorithm in CBC mode [1] . Some other padding schemes leading to decryption attacks have been identified (see e.g. [2, 5, 7, 11] ).
Our results. We first formalize in Section 2 the notion of preencryption scheme and its associated ∆-IND security notion. We formalize the notion of preencryption by padding (or the pad-then-encrypt technique). When Enc 0 is lengthpreserving, we show that ∆-IND-security is necessary and sufficient to make Enc ∆-IND-OTE secure.
Then, we show in Section 3 that there is always an adversary with advantage nearly ∆ B . That is, the insecurity degrades linearly with the padding length B. This main result happens to have a very simple proof by using a diagonal argument.
We observe that a padding scheme making padding lengths uniformly distributed makes the above adversary nearly the best one. So, this preencryption scheme is nearly optimal.
In Section 4, we further precisely study the optimal padding scheme in the uniform case for ∆ = 2.
Preliminaries
In what follows we consider an alphabet Z. This can be a Boolean alphabet, or the set of bytes, or a set of blocks. We denote by Z * the set of finite sequences of elements taken from Z. The length of an element x ∈ Z * is denoted by |x|. For x, x ∈ Z * , we denote by x x the concatenation of x and x .
In this paper we adopt exact security notions. We can easily translate to asymptotic security by introducing security parameters in the definition of encryption schemes. We say that an encryption scheme t-fully leaks the plaintext length if there exists an algorithm f such that for all x in the plaintext domain, f (Enc K (x)) = |x| with probability 1 within a complexity at most t.
Encryption
For instance, a length-preserving encryption scheme fully leaks the plaintext length by f (y) = |y|.
For symmetric encryption, the key generation algorithm simply picks a key in a given key space, following the uniform distribution. For public-key encryption, the key can be split in a public part and a private part. The encryption algorithm only use the public part. What follows applies to both cases.
We define the ∆-IND-OTE security notion as follows: 4: Adversary guesses b and wins if b = b IND-OTE security corresponds to the ∆ = 0 case. We also consider E-IND-OTE security defined by the ∆ = +∞ case.
Preencryption Schemes
Definition 3. Given two plaintext domains X and X 0 , a preencryption scheme from X to X 0 is a pair of algorithms -a (probabilistic) algorithm pre such that for all x ∈ X , pre(x) ∈ X 0 with probability 1 -a (deterministic) algorithm Extract
The correctness property of a preencryption scheme states that for all x ∈ X , Extract(pre(x)) = x with probability 1.
We say that a preencryption scheme is B-almost length preserving if
with probability 1 for all x. We say that a preencryption scheme is lengthincreasing if |pre(x)| ≥ |x| with probability 1 for all x. We say that a preencryption scheme is strictly length-increasing if |pre(x)| > |x| with probability 1 for all x. 
Proof. We have
and the other expression follows by separating the ∈ A cases.
We define Adv(x 0 , x 1 ) as the maximal advantage for (computationally unbounded) adversaries selecting x 0 and x 1 . Proof. Since we consider unbounded adversaries, an optimal one using x 0 and x 1 can be assumed to be of form D A (x 0 , x 1 ) without loss of generality. By Lemma 5 we clearly have
Given an encryption scheme
and a preencryption scheme P = (pre, Extract) from X to X 0 we define the encryption scheme C = (X , Gen, Enc, Dec)
and Dec K (y) = Extract(Dec 0 K (y)) Clearly, this defines an encryption scheme. If the preencryption scheme is Balmost length-preserving and the encryption scheme C 0 is length-preserving, then the encryption scheme C is B-almost length preserving.
Theorem 7.
We assume there exist a constant t S and a sampling algorithm S(1 L ) to pick a random element of X 0 of length L with complexity at most t S for any L ∈ {|x|; x ∈ X 0 }. There exists a (small) constant c such that for any C, C 0 , t, t P , if C 0 is a IND-OTE(t +t S +t P + c, ε 0 )-secure encryption scheme and if P is a ∆-IND(t +t S +t P + c, ε 1 )-secure preencryption scheme and pre can be computed within a complexity bounded by t P , then C is a ∆-IND-OTE(t, 2ε 0 + ε 1 )-secure encryption scheme.
When C 0 t 0 -fully leaks the plaintext length, if C is ∆-IND-OTE(t +t 0 + c, ε)-secure then P is ∆-IND(t, ε)-secure.
So, for an IND-OTE-secure encryption C 0 which fully leaks the plaintext length, the ∆-IND security of P is necessary and sufficient to have C ∆-IND-OTEsecure.
Proof. Let A be a ∆-IND-OTE adversary for C which has a time complexity bounded by t. We want to prove that its advantage is less than 2ε 0 + ε 1 .
We define the following adversary A . For the second part of the theorem, we now let A be a ∆-IND adversary for P of complexity bounded by t and we want to bound its advantage. Since C 0 fully leaks the plaintext length, there is a function f to compute the plaintext length from the ciphertext. We define the following adversary: 
Pad-then-Encrypt Scheme Definition 8. A C subset of Z * is postfix-free if
We observe that if the empty string belongs to C then no other string is in C.
Furthermore, there exists a function Extract such that for all s ∈ X and for all
x ∈ C, we have Extract(s x) = s with probability 1. In what follows we consider a postfix-free set such that this function can be efficiently implemented. A padding scheme defines the preencryption scheme
We note that preencryption schemes made out from a padding scheme are all length-increasing. Except in the constant 0-padding case, they are even strictly length increasing.
Example 10. We consider the padding scheme defined by the parameter B as follows: given x, we simply pick a sequence 100 · · · 0 of length N which is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , B}. This padding scheme is B-almost length preserving, strictly length-increasing, and uniform. By Lemma 5 and 6, we obtain that Adv(x 0 , x 1 ) =
) -secure for all ∆ and any t.
In what follows we show that this scheme is nearly optimal.
To make a pad-then-encrypt construction secure with ∆ large, we shall find a secure padding scheme for this ∆. A trivial solution consists of making sure that x pad(x) has a constant length no matter the plaintext x. To make it possible, this length must be at least the maximal length of a plaintext. This solution is clearly impractical. We shall rather concentrate on ∆ small. So, we do not fully hide the length of plaintexts but rather their exact value.
Maximal Security of the Pad-then-Encrypt Scheme
In this section we consider lower bounds for the best advantage of an adversary against a preencryption scheme. We consider the case where the plaintext space is large and dense enough so that we can make sequences of plaintexts such that the length of two consecutive ones differ by ∆.
Definition 11. We say that a sequence (x 0 , . . . , x n ) of Z * elements is a ∆-chain if for every i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we have |x i+1 | − |x i | = ∆. We say that this sequence represents a length if |x 0 | ≤ ≤ |x n |. We say that a subset X of Z * is ∆-dense if for any x, y ∈ X , there exists a ∆-chain in X which represents |x| and |y|. We say that X is B-large if there exists x, y ∈ X such that |x| − |y| ≥ B. Proof. Let n = cB ∆ +1 with c = 1 for length-increasing preencryption schemes and c = 2 otherwise. Since the domain is (cB + ∆)-large and ∆-dense, we can construct a ∆-chain of n + 1 elements
which is the probability that the preencrypted version of x i has an overhead length bounded by B + |x 0 | − |x i | = B − i∆. Clearly, s 0 = 1 since P is B-almost length preserving, and s n = 0 since B − n∆
: there is an adversary with an advantage larger than . In particular, when ∆ divides B, the scheme in Example 10 is optimal.
Theorem 12 can be generalized to preencryption schemes which are unbounded, but with finite expected overhead length. In practice, we would like to have a guarantee that a preencryption overhead is not too long on average, so this is a pretty reasonable assumption. Proof. We apply the same proof method as in Theorem 12. We define n = αB ∆ and
for α such as the scheme is (αB)-large. We have s 0 ≥ 1 − 
. We can just take α = 2 and conclude.
Uniform Padding Schemes
In this section, we consider a uniform padding scheme. We let N be a random variable following the distribution of |pad(x)|. We assume that Pr[N = 0] = 0: the padding scheme is strictly length-increasing. Since the scheme is uniform, the distribution does not depend on x. In notations, we further replace plaintexts 
If no such j exists, then we have
for all j ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
Since B is divisible by ∆, this inequality is in fact an equality. Thus, we cannot have 
Thus in all cases ε ≥ For ∆ = 1, B is divisible by ∆ so Example 10 gives an optimal padding scheme. For ∆ = 2 and B even, it is the same. For ∆ = 2 and B odd, the optimal case is characterized as follows. so the bound to be proven is consistent with the one from Theorem 12. Let
Adv(a, b)
We have ε = max(ε 1 , ε 2 ).
We let α =
. We note that
. Furthermore, . We now want to prove that there is no distribution for N achieving a lower ε. . We take A = {a + 1, a + 2, . . . , a + i + 2} and we obtain Table 1 for small values of B.
Conclusion
We have shown that a padding scheme adding strings with uniformly distributed length is nearly optimal and that its security is roughly ∆ 2B . The optimal scheme can be slightly better but still close to this bound. This shows that the price to pay for making ε-indistinguishable two plaintexts with a single bit of length difference (i.e. 1-IND-OTE(t, ε)-security) is to append a padding of length ε −1 2 , which is impractical for the usual security levels we target for encryption (e.g. ε = 2 −80 ). 
